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A POST-FORMATION RIGHT OF WITHDRAWAL 
FROM CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW?: 
SOME CAUTIONARY NOTES 
SAMUEL ESTREICHER * 
I 
Duke law professors Curtis Bradley and Mitu Gulati (“B&G”) have 
written a very interesting, original paper questioning the conventional view 
of the binding effect of customary international law (“CIL”). That view 
holds that once a customary rule becomes law, by dint of the widespread 
practice of states in the belief that they are legally required to adhere to that 
practice (termed opinio juris), the rule is binding on all states, with the 
possible exception of those who persistently objected to the rule during its 
formative stages.1 B&G maintain that this “Mandatory View” of CIL is an 
ill-conceived twentieth-century alteration of a previously established 
“Default View” of CIL that would allow states to withdraw from customary 
rules even if their objections are voiced after the rule has acquired the 
status of customary law. As they see it, the Default View does a better job 
of accommodating legal change than does the conventional position. 
The effect of adopting the B&G formulation would be to require 
international tribunals and international lawyers to recognize a subsequent-
objector right or privilege2 in CIL. Putting aside the merits of their 
formulation for one moment, one needs to ask how such a fairly dramatic 
revision of international law will in fact occur. It is not likely to come about 
through the conventional route of changing a customary rule―a state 
 
 * Dwight D. Opperman Professor of Law & Co-Director, Opperman Institute of Judicial 
Administration. Text of paper for Scholarship Roundtable, “Opting Out of Customary International 
Law,” Duke University School of Law, January 30, 2010. In addition to the Roundtable participants, 
my valued colleague Ryan Goodman has been very generous with his comments; all errors remain my 
responsibility. Copyright © 2010 by Samuel Estreicher. All rights are reserved. 
 1. Curtis J. Bradley and Mitu Gulati, Withdrawing from International Custom, 120 YALE L. J. 
202 (2010) [hereinafter B&G]. 
 2. I call this a “subsequent-objector right or privilege” because, while post-formation objection 
by states occurs under current law—indeed, it is a principal means of changing customary law—such 
objections, in the conventional account, are normatively disfavored and treated as “violations,” even if 
they are sometimes necessary to legal change. B&G’s innovation is to embrace the normative 
acceptability of such objections. 
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“violating,” or attempting to displace, a customary rule with a new rule that 
ultimately commands a new consensus and confirmatory practice.3 This is 
because, as will be seen below, states are not likely to justify their breach 
of a customary rule by express subsequent objection, persistent or 
otherwise. A new Convention on CIL, on the order of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties, is also a long shot. And even if it were 
established, the convenors would not likely be moved by functional 
arguments in favor of a right of subsequent objection, given the rhetorical 
and other benefits of the Mandatory View. 
CIL is a profoundly stable institution, not because it has been able to 
address successfully the serious analytical challenges academics and others 
have leveled4 but because of the advantages it provides its principal 
players: states (including their armed forces, other personnel and lawyers), 
international tribunals, and publicists/academics. Most often, interstate 
disputes are resolved by what might be called the self-interested application 
of prudence or comity; there is normally little point in acting unreasonably 
with respect to other states if you will need those states to recognize your 
similar claims on other occasions. After a settled practice has emerged, 
publicists or the International Law Commission then may attempt a formal 
recitation of the practice. 
 It is this strong dimension of reciprocity that explains the 
development of, say, diplomatic immunity law and customary rules on the 
recognition of foreign judgments in domestic tribunals. For other matters, 
either the prospect of reciprocity may be less important or changes in 
relative power or stage of development among states may provoke change 
in customary practices. For such disputes, CIL provides a currency, 
linguistic and otherwise, for negotiating differences that avoids the 
language of self-interest, does not require use or overt threat of force or 
other countermeasures and need not practically bind anyone, unless states 
have agreed ex ante or ex post to refer the dispute to the International Court 
of Justice (“ICJ”) or other arbitral mechanism for resolution under CIL.5 
For weak states―i.e., those that lack the means to use self-help measures to 
enforce their expectations of appropriate behavior by other states, such as 
 
 3. See generally Anthony D’Amato, The President and International Law: A Missing Dimension, 
81 AM. J. INT’L L. 375, 377 (1987) (“Existing customary law, then, contains the seeds of its own 
violation; otherwise it could never change itself.”). 
 4. See, e.g., Eugene Kontorovich, Inefficient Customs in International Law, 48 WM. & MARY. L. 
REV. 859 (2006); Samuel Estreicher, Rethinking the Binding Effect of Customary International Law, 44 
VA. J.INT’L L. 5 (2003). 
 5. It is often ignored that the ICJ functions principally as an arbitral forum, except when it issues 
advisory opinions to aid the work of United Nations bodies. 
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seizing of fishing boats nearing waters to which they lay claim―CIL 
provides a means of saving face and registering objections short of force. 
For strong states―i.e., those that can use self-help with relative 
impunity―CIL provides a means of signaling the intensity of their claim 
initially without actually declaring resort to self-help or other force. 
The law-speak afforded by CIL also permits a measure of flexibility 
with respect to treaty-making. This is, of course, the explanation for the so-
called Martens clause6 that gives treaty-makers the best of all worlds―a 
specific code to guide behavior, with the assurance that whatever is left out 
of the treaty will still be governed by international law via CIL. A state that 
does not wish to agree to every aspect of a multilateral treaty, in a context 
where reputational loss is likely if it bows out entirely, may agree to 
aspects of the treaty coupled with reassurance to its sister states that it 
remains bound by customary law on the subject.7 Some non-assenting 
states may in fact be counting on the likelihood that the principles set forth 
in the treaty, to which they have agreed, will help shape lacunae in 
customary law. 
International tribunals also benefit from the flexible, if not amorphous, 
nature of CIL jurisprudence. To the extent the jurisdiction of these tribunals 
depends on the ex ante or ex parte agreement of the states to submit their 
disputes, these tribunals act essentially as arbitration mechanisms. They are 
not likely to resort to hard-and-fast legal rules both because they implicitly 
do not wish to alienate states from submitting future disputes to them but, 
more importantly, because the parties are not usually seeking an up-or-
down declaration of rights respecting their positions, but rather a more 
mediated, or nuanced, resolution based on flexible principles that resemble 
equity―giving something, if only rhetorically, to both sides. 
And of course when we get to publicists and academics, the virtues of 
CIL are obvious. Like constitutional law and conflicts of law, CIL is an 
area of law where academics unofficially rule; they are the principal organs 
 
 6. See, e.g., Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague IV), Oct. 18, 1907; Geneva Convention 
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, art. 142, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.N.T.S. 3616; Geneva 
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, art.158, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 
U.N.T.S. 3516. 
 7. A good example is Israel’s position that although it will not sign the 1977 Additional 
Protocols to the Geneva Conventions, it adopts many of their substantive provisions as declaratory of 
customary international law binding in its courts. See Eval Benvenisti, Reclaiming Democracy: The 
Strategic Uses of Foreign and International Law by National Courts, 102 AM. J. INT’L L. 241 (2008); 
see generally Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3; Protocol 
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-
International Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609. 
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for discerning and elaborating customary law. The decentralized, nuanced, 
flexible, and multi-pronged nature of customary rules virtually invites 
publicist/academic exposition, restatement, and intramural debate.8 Given 
that these factors suggest that the relevant actors in the international law-
making system are likely to be deeply entrenched in their endorsement of 
the binding nature of CIL, the practical burden is a heavy one for those 
seeking to alter conventional understandings. 
Even the beginning of a thoughtful consideration of the Default View 
will not occur, I suggest, until further work is done on whether the treatise 
writers and other publicists, the Permanent Court on Arbitration, the Statute 
of the International Court of Justice (ICJ)9 and the decisions of the ICJ and 
other tribunals expounding the Mandatory View of CIL have 
misinterpreted their sources or have otherwise gotten the law wrong. Here, 
we need evidence of actual practice of state objection to, or withdrawal 
from, settled rules during the period of the Default View―evidence lacking 
in the treatises and other secondary literature cited by B&G in (Parts II and 
III of) their article―as well as a more detailed account of the changeover to 
the Mandatory View, including whether the players recognized they were 
doing something new, and explained why they were doing it. Without such 
preliminary work, it is too easy for defenders of the conventional view, set 
in their ways for the reasons given, to dismiss proponents of revision as 
building a mountain out of a molehill of poorly crafted language from early 
treatises arguably taken out of context. 
II 
Even if one is a critic of the expansive conceptions of CIL (as I am), 
such as those propounding a form of “instant customary law” (which 
 
 8. Identifying state practice has always been a difficult endeavor; which may help explain why 
some current academic writing seeks to equate state practice with certain forms of opinio juris—
forming what might be called “instant custom”. See, e.g., Anthony T. Guzman, Saving Customary 
International Law, 27 MICH. J. INT’L L. 114 (2005). 
 9. Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38 (reciting the sources the court may rely 
upon in deciding international law disputes, rather than expounding an authoritative listing of the 
sources of international law); cf. IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 3 (5th 
ed., 1998) (These provisions [referring also to Article 59] are expressed in terms of the function of the 
Court, but they express the previous practice of arbitral tribunals, and Article 38 is generally regarded 
as a complete statement of the sources of international law. Yet the article itself does not refer to 
‘sources’ and, if looked at closely, cannot be regarded as a straightforward enumeration of the 
sources.”); but see Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 102 (1987), 
Reporters’ Notes (“[Sources listed in Article 38 are] ‘sources’ of international law, in the sense that they 
are the ways in which rules become, or become accepted as, international law.”). 
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essentially dispenses with the actual-practice requirement)10 or advocating 
“customary” limitations on the ability of states to place reservations on 
their assent to treaties,11 it is not clear whether recognition of a right of 
subsequent objection will have any practical effect, and if does whether the 
effect will be to narrow rather than broaden the reach of CIL.  I offer a 
number of reasons for this cautionary note. 
First, a rule facilitating exit may well increase production and enlarge 
the reach of CIL.12 This is because exit helps mollify, in theory, objections 
to the non-consensual basis of CIL. It could help spur even further the 
ambitions of proponents of instant, elastic, “modern custom.” Thus, it is not 
surprising that Professor Anthony Guzman, an instant-CIL proponent, is 
open to recognition of a right of subsequent objection.13 
Second, a right of subsequent objection is not likely to be invoked to 
any significant degree by states. Despite the perhaps qualified acceptance 
of the right of persistent objectors to exclude themselves from customary 
law still in the making—a right that enjoys some recognition in ICJ 
rulings,14 treatise writers, and the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign 
Relations Law of the United States (Restatement)15—states generally do 
not claim persistent-objector status when they object to supposed 
 
 10. See North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, 1969 I.C.J. 3, 43 (Feb. 20) (judgment) (“[A]lthough 
the passage of only a short period of time is not necessarily, or of itself, a bar to the formation of a new 
rule of customary international law on the basis of what was originally a purely conventional rule, an 
indispensable requirement would be that within the period in question, short though it might be, State 
practice, including that of States whose interests are specially affected, should have been both extensive 
and virtually uniform in the sense of the provision invoked;—and should moreover have occurred in 
such a way as to show a general recognition that a rule of law or legal obligation is involved.”). 
 11. See Ryan Goodman, Human Rights Treaties, Invalid Reservations, and State Consent, 96 AM. 
J. INT’L L. 521 (2002). 
 12. The prospect of increased production of CIL would not necessarily win over adherents of the 
Mandatory View. Much would depend on whether such adherents care more about preserving the law-
speak or the traditional requirements of existing arrangements than they welcome the additional 
creation of instant custom facilitated by post-formation exit rights. 
13 See Guzman, supra note 8, at, 169 (requiring a state to object “from the moment at which it has 
an interest in the issue”). There is, of course, more than one reason why some have urged movement 
away from the actual-practice requirement of CIL. Identifying state practice has always been a difficult 
endeavor—which perhaps explains why some academic writers have sought to equate state practice 
with certain forms of opinio juris. 
 14. Arguably the ICJ’s reference to the persistent-objector principle in the Fisheries Case (U.K. v. 
Nor.), 1951 I.C.J. 116 (Dec. 18), and the Asylum Case (Colombia v. Peru), 1950 I.C.J. 266 (Nov. 20), 
can be dismissed as dictum not necessary to the ruling because “the Court in each case had determined 
that the substantive rule to which objection was made was not binding on states generally.” Ted L. 
Stein, The Approach of the Different Drummer: The Principle of the Persistent Objector in 
International Law, 26 HARV. INT’L L. J. 457, 460 (1985). 
 15. See Restatement § 102, comment e. 
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customary rules.16 They, rather, employ the “more attractive” argument that 
the preconditions for customary law in the particular case have not been 
established.17 Both rhetorically in international tribunals and practically 
when seeking to justify use of sanctions, states are on firmer ground when 
objecting to the existence of a customary rule rather than urging a 
persistent-objector exclusion from an established rule. If the state is also 
seeking to induce change in the underlying rule, here, too, the law-speak 
that CIL permits enables objecting states to launch a new practice and, if 
challenged, justify their conduct by claiming that there is no prior binding 
practice, that the ostensibly new practice is merely a continuation of 
custom, or that the ostensibly new practice is a new, superseding custom. 
They are not likely, even for the sake of argument, to concede they are 
violating CIL. 
A right of subsequent objection, by contrast, could not be exercised 
sub silentio but would have to be expressly asserted, as B&G acknowledge: 
“Withdrawals would have to be planned and announced ahead of time, 
thereby reducing the scope for opportunistic exits. Moreover, a reasonable 
notice period might be imposed in situations in which reliance interests are 
at stake.”18 
Even though lawyers can always argue in the alternative, the objector 
in the B&G scheme would have to make clear that it was acting in 
contravention of the customary rule. Indeed, it is the very purpose of the 
B&G proposal to give normative recognition to such objections.  Yet, to 
the extent states have been reluctant to claim persistent-objector status 
during the formative period of a customary rule, is it likely they will grab 
 
 16. See, e.g., Stein, supra note 14, at 459 (“The paucity of empirical referents for the persistent 
objector principle is striking.”), 460-61 (despite objections to any inroads on the rule of absolute 
sovereign immunity, court decisions do not indicate that the Soviet Union “claimed the benefits of 
persistent objector status in any of the numerous cases in which Soviet agencies or instrumentalities 
have been sued in various national courts”), 462 (several examples from the law of the sea); Jonathan 
Charney, The Persistent Objector Rule and the Development of Customary International Law, BRIT. 
Y.B. INT’L L. 1, 11 (1985) (“One can look in vain through writers’ discussions of the persistent objector 
rule for references to State practice that clearly support the rule.”). 
 17. See Maurice H. Mendelson, The Formation of Customary International Law, 272 HAGUE 
ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, COLLECTED COURSES 155, 234 (1998) (“[F]rom a rhetorical 
standpoint, so to speak, reliance on the persistent objector rule is not likely to be the preferred mode of 
argumentation. It is much more attractive for a State to be able say: ‘No general rule has emerged (inter 
alia) because my opposition (and that of like-minded States) has prevented its doing so,’ than to say ‘I 
concede that a general rule has emerged, but I am not bound by it because of my persistent objection.’ 
Legally, the latter argument could shift the ‘burden of proof’ from the State asserting that a general rule 
exists to the one seeking the application of the alleged rule; and, diplomatically, the persistent objector 
argument admits that the State making it is the ‘odd man out.’”). 
 18. B&G, supra note 1, at 258-59; accord Guzman, supra note 8. 
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the mantle of subsequent-objector status when the rule has already acquired 
its footing as customary law? 
“Nations would still be responsible for their past actions,”19 B&G 
advise. In the fishing-rights example offered above, would the state 
objecting to, say, a previously customary 10-mile verge be able to engage 
in post-withdrawal fishing in the same waters without being branded a 
violator? Conversely, would the coastal state seeking to enlarge a 
previously customary 5-mile limit be able to punish post-withdrawal 
fishing in the newly enlarged zone without violation? The often hazy line 
between separating past, completed actions from continuing actions is 
likely further to dampen state interest in express objection or withdrawal. 
Third, without destabilizing areas of CIL that do work effectively to 
maintain interstate cooperation, a right of subsequent objection would not 
be applicable, as a practical matter, in contexts where, like the fishing-
rights example above, the normative force of the customary rule―whether 
announced as law or a principle of comity―is due to state expectations of 
customary behavior. Strong states, willing to incur the costs of angering 
their neighbors, can try to change expectations through unilateral action, 
but it is difficult affirmatively to treat such behavior as appropriate without 
undermining the normative force of the prior rule or, perhaps, the entire 
system. B&G wisely require reasonable notice of unilateral change, but that 
mitigating measure ultimately does not solve the problem. 
Given this dynamic, any right of subsequent objection will be 
exercised, if at all, only with respect to rules where states do not have direct 
material interests and where their unilateral act will not disrupt settled 
expectations of other states. Customary international human rights law 
(CIHRL) would seem an area where the state is essentially an altruistic 
actor endorsing a moral position concerning the behavior of other states. It 
is precisely in this area, however, where CIL claims outstripping state 
practice tend to proliferate, that B&G seem to draw back: “There may be 
situations . . . in which we can be confident, ex ante, that the interests of 
governments and populations will diverge, and where the moral 
considerations are so strong that they override the usual deference to 
national governments.”20 Without gainsaying the underlying concern or 
evaluating here whether this characterization of CIHRL captures the moral 
entrepreneurship of non-governmental organizations and other policy elites 
in this process, B&G’s apparent concession removes much of any 
remaining practical role for express objection or withdrawal. 
 
 19. B&G, supra note 1, at 258 
 20. Id. at 267. 
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III 
I welcome B&G’s contribution to the CIL literature and the goal of 
furthering a functional understanding of customary rules. I suspect, in the 
end, that the system is better off with vigilant insistence on the 
conventional requirements for CIL formation―widespread practice and 
opinio juris―and the conventional consequences for the formation of 
customary rules that you are bound until by your practice and the practice 
of other states the customary rule gives way to a new custom. 
 
